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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
MLDC, the employer of probationer Matt Eugene Ruck, appeals from the
district court's order denying MLDC's request that a laptop computer seized from
Ruck during a probation search be turned over to MLDC.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Matt Eugene Ruck pied guilty to one count of forgery and admitted a
probation violation in a different case. (R., vol. I, pp. 81-82.) The district court
imposed a sentence of seven years with two years determinate on the forgery
and a concurrent sentence of three years with one fixed related to the probation
violation. (R., vol. I, pp. 82, 85.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (R., vol. I,
pp. 83, 86.)
At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court
suspended the sentences and placed Ruck on probation.

(R., vol. I, pp. 110,

114-119.) Conditions of that probation included that Ruck "not be self-employed"
and that he not be "named on any bank account and not apply for any extended
credit or be a party of any credit arrangements." (R., vol. I, pp. 110, 119.) Ruck
also agreed to submit to searches by probation and parole officers. (R., vol. I,
pp.117-18.)
A subsequent probation search of Ruck's backpack showed evidence that
Ruck had violated his probation by travelling to New Orleans and American
Samoa in violation of a probation condition that he not leave the state without
permission.

(R., vol. II, pp. 156-57, 246.)
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Also in the backpack were two

computers-a laptop and an i-Pad-which probation officers seized. (R., vol. II,
pp. 157-58, 246.) Probation officers also seized credit cards and other evidence
Ruck was not in compliance with various terms of his probation. (R., vol. II, pp.
158, 168-70.)
Ruck's employer, MLDC, claimed ownership of the laptop computer and
filed a civil action for its return. (R., vol. II, pp. 128-54, 171-84, 246.) The district
court in the criminal case treated MLDC's filing as a motion for return of property
and denied it. (R., vol. II, pp. 245-52.) MLDC appealed. (R., vol. II, pp. 254-58.)
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ISSUES
MLDC states the issues on appeal as:

A.

Does a defendant's probationary status in a closed criminal
case qualify as a "pending action" for purposes of
establishing forum in an Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (e) motion?

B.

Whether the Respondent's failure to adhere to Idaho
Criminal Rule 49(a) resulted in an interference of [sic]
MLDC's right to procedural due process.

C.

Was MLDC's right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure under the 4th Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State
Constitution violated by the seizure and pending search of
the corporate laptop?

D.

Did the District Court err in denying MLDC's motion for the
return of unlawfully seized property under Idaho Criminal
Rule 41 (e)?

(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Did the district court have jurisdiction over motions for return of property
taken as a result of a probation search?

2.

Has MLDC failed to show any error in the denial of its request for the
laptop computer?
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ARGUMENT

I.
MLDC Has Failed To Show That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Deny
His Request For Return Of The Laptop

A.

Introduction
MLDC initially filed a petition with a civil case number seeking custody of

the laptop. (R., vol. II, pp. 136-42.) That matter was stayed and the question of
custody of the laptop was addressed in the criminal case in which Ruck was on
probation. (R., vol. II, pp. 245-52.) On appeal MLDC contends that the district
court erred when it concluded that the criminal case was the appropriate forum
for resolution of its request for the laptop.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-21. 1)

MLDC's argument is without merit because the district court had jurisdiction to
resolve claims arising from the supervision of Ruck's probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
Jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de nova. State v. Barros, 131

Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998); State v. Law, 131 Idaho 90, 93,
952 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1997). The interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule
presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review.
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91-92, 90 P.3d 314, 316-17 (2004) (citing State v.

1

MLDC also argues that the state's failure to serve Ruck with MLDC's motion
somehow "negatively impacted" some unspecified rights held by MLDC and
therefore should result in reversal of the district court's order. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 21-24.) MLDC has not supported this claim with any relevant legal authority
suggesting that MLDC may assert Ruck's alleged due process rights. State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported
by authority "will not be considered" on appeal).
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Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997); State v. Dallas, 126 Idaho
273, 274, 882 P.2d 440, 441 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Rule On MLDC's Request For
Return Of The Laptop
Procedural rules are interpreted according to principles of statutory

construction. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900, 188
P.3d 834, 843 (2008). The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent.

State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010);

Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).
Because "the best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v.
Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

Where the statutory

language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law
as written. Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135
P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only
one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was
"palpably absurd").
Applying these standards to l.C.R. 41 (e) shows that the district court had
jurisdiction in the criminal case to hear MLDC's request to obtain custody of the
laptop seized from Ruck during a probation search. Rule 41 (e) provides that a

5

"person aggrieved by a search and seizure may move the district court for the
return of the property." l.C.R. 41 (e). The motion "shall" be presented "only" in
the criminal case if one is "pending," but if no criminal case is pending a civil
action "may be filed in the county where the property is seized or located." l.C.R.
41(e). The plain language of this rule is that the motion shall be presented only
in the pending criminal case, but may be presented as a civil case only if "no
[criminal] action is pending." l.C.R. 41 (e). Because the criminal case against
Ruck was pending insofar as his probation was still being managed by the district
court, the district court correctly concluded that the motion was required to be
filed in the criminal case.
Generally a "district court's jurisdiction is completed upon the 'entry of the
judgment and sentence or its affirmance on appeal."' State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho
207, 211, 912 P.2d 94, 98 (1996) (quoting State v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 157, 161,
269 P.2d 769, 771 (1954)).

Thus, a court, having exercised its original

jurisdiction to completion of the case, loses jurisdiction to consider collateral or
other attacks upon that judgment.

kl "Absent a statute or rule extending its

jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or
affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79
P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (footnote omitted). As noted by the district court, it had
ongoing jurisdiction to supervise Ruck's probation and to determine any
probation violations Ruck might commit. l.C. § 20-222. (See R., pp. 247-48.)
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Because the court had ongoing jurisdiction in the criminal case, the
criminal case was pending for purposes of l.C.R. 41 (e). The plain language and
clear intent of the rule is that the court with familiarity with and jurisdiction over
the criminal proceedings is the proper forum for determining whether to return
property seized as part of a criminal investigation, but if no court had acquired
jurisdiction, or if criminal jurisdiction had ended, potentially aggrieved parties
should still have a forum to seek a remedy. Because the district court in this
case had jurisdiction over the probation, the district court properly concluded it
was the proper forum for the l.C.R. 41 (e) motion.2

II.
MLDC Has Failed To Show It Was Entitled To The Laptop

A.

Introduction
The district court held that the laptop was properly seized pursuant to a

probation search. (R., vol. II, pp. 248-52.) MLDC argues that the district court
erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-43.) Application of the proper legal standards
shows no error because the laptop was reasonably shown to have been in
probationer Ruck's possession.

2

Even if the district court should have treated this as a civil petition instead of an
l.C.R. 41 (e) motion, the error was harmless. The rules of civil procedure provide
that the Court "must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." l.R.C.P. 61. Whether the decision
of the district court was pursuant to criminal motion or civil petition is ultimately
irrelevant to the outcome of the proceeding, and thus by definition any error was
harmless. ,
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). Because the question
before the district court was whether the laptop was "illegally seized," l.C.R.
41 (e), this standard of review would also be applicable in this case.

C.

The Laptop Was Legally Seized
MLDC is only entitled to return of the laptop if it was "illegally seized."

I.RE. 41 (e).

The seizure of the laptop was legal, however, for two reasons.

First, the seizure was based on reasonable suspicion that it contains evidence of
a probation violation by Ruck.

Second, the seizure of the laptop is within the

scope of Ruck's probationary consent to searches.

Finally, the seizure of the

laptop did not exceed the scope of a proper probationary search.
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against
governmental intrusion. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a
probationer is subject to warrantless searches by a probation officer if that
probation officer has reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated
probation. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 48788, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 (2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after
conviction but before sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion);
State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008)
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(probation searches based on suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of
a warrantless search condition"). The probation officer had reasonable suspicion
that Ruck had violated his probation both by traveling out of state without consent
and by having credit cards. (R., vol. II, pp. 158, 168-70, 246.) Thus, the seizure
and search of the computer is reasonable based on suspicion that Ruck violated
the terms of his probation.
The Idaho Supreme Court "has determined that a probationer's consent to
searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights." State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987)). A search of probationers or parolees is reasonable
if conducted according to an express probation or parole provision allowing
suspicionless searches. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006). Where
the search is pursuant to a specific provision of probation or parole that allows
suspicionless searches, the reasonableness of the search does not rely on the
consent exception.

ill at

852 n.3 ("we decline to rest our holding today on the

consent rationale"). The seizure and search was thus also justified by Ruck's
probationary waiver of Fourth Amendment rights even if suspicionless. (R., vol.
II, pp. 248-52.)
The scope of a probationary search and seizure of property is based on
"joint access or control of the property searched." State v. Barker, 136 Idaho
728, 730-31, 40 P.3d 86, 88-89 (2002). The inquiry "does not rest upon the law
of property" but whether the probationer had "joint access or control for most
purposes."

ill

at 731, 40 P.3d at 89 (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, a
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probationary search of a container or area must be based on "reasonable
suspicion that [the probationer] owned, possessed, or controlled the item."

kl

The district court applied the rule as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court
in Barker. (R., vol. II, p. 249.) The Court found reasonable suspicion that Ruck
controlled the laptop based on evidence that Ruck claimed ownership of the
backpack where the laptop was found and other evidence of probation violations
was also found in the backpack. Ruck stated he used the laptop for business
purposes and had the password to access it. Even MLDC's witness admitted
Ruck's possession and control of the laptop.

(R., vol. II, p. 250.) Because a

probation search and seizure of the laptop was justified by both reasonable
suspicion of a probation violation and a condition of probation allowing
suspicionless searches, and because probationer Ruck had possession and
control of the laptop, the seizure was proper.
MLDC attempts to distinguish Barker on the following grounds: (1) There
is no "convincing evidence" that the laptop contains evidence of Ruck's probation
violation.

(Appellant's brief, p. 35.)

The state need not show "convincing

evidence" that particular evidence would be found on the laptop but only
reasonable suspicion that Ruck controlled the laptop. Barker, 136 Idaho at 731,
40 P.3d at 89. Because the evidence showed Ruck controlled the laptop it was
within the scope of a proper probationary search.
(2) Because the laptop was not searched "on site" it was taken outside the
scope of consent. (Appellant's brief, p. 35.) MLDC's argument appears to be
that by taking control of the laptop the government deprived Ruck of possession,
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and therefore removed the laptop from the scope of the probation search.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35.) This argument is nonsensical. The scope of a
probation search is not based on mere possession but on "access or control for
most purposes." Barker, 136 Idaho at 731, 40 P.3d at 89. The state submits that
the relevant time-frame for such in inquiry is when the government seized the
laptop. Otherwise a probation officer could never conduct a search of any item
or container he seizes. MLDC's proposed standard of depriving the probation
officer the ability to search any item or container he seizes is obviously flawed.
(3) MLDC argues it has the ability to prevent a search of the laptop by
objecting.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 30-31, 34.)

MLDC relies on Georgia v.

Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as
reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to police by another resident."
MLDC's contention that it is entitled to return of the laptop on this basis is flawed,
however.
First, as noted above, the seizure of the laptop was based both on the
probationary waiver of Fourth Amendment rights and upon the probation
exception.

Neither of these probation and parole exceptions to the warrant

requirement rely upon a consent rationale. See, SL..9.:.. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852
n.3 ("we decline to rest our holding today on the consent rationale"). Where the
government has a legitimate interest in assuring compliance with probation or
parole, such an interest is not defeated merely because of an objection by a third
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party. See State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 911 n.3, 174 P.3d 876, 881 n.3 (Ct.
App. 2007) (search of apartment where probationer Cruz was houseguest did not
violate Cruz's rights regardless of whether evidence would have been admissible
against resident of apartment). Because the state does not need a probationer's
permission to conduct a probation search based on probable cause or a specific
provision allowing suspicionless searches, denial of consent by another resident
or person with control does not make the ensuing search or seizure
unreasonable under the rationale of Randolph. MLDC's objection is not effective
to prevent the state from asserting its interests in monitoring Ruck's probation.
Second, l.R.E. 41(e) allows for the return of property "on the ground that
that the person is entitled to lawful possession of the property and that it was
illegally seized." (Emphasis added.) Because the laptop was not seized over the

"express refusal of consent by a physically present resident" its seizure does not
fall within the ambit of the holding of Randolph. Thus, even under a consent
rationale MLDC has failed to show entitlement to return of the laptop.
MLDC has failed to show that the laptop was illegally seized.

It has

therefore failed to show error in the district court's denial of MLDC's request that
the laptop be turned over to it.

12

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denial of MLDC's request for custody of the laptop taken from probationer Ruck.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of November, 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
GREGORY R. RAUCH
Magyar, Rauch & Thie, PLLC
326 East 5th Street
Moscow, ID 83843

K NNETH K. JORGENS ·
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/pm

13

